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Abstract
In the face of the ‘refugee crisis’, many European governments, even in traditionally 
liberal states, unilaterally introduced a number of restrictive and, often, controversial 
migration, asylum, and border control policies. I argue that past legal- bureaucratic 
choices on migration and asylum policies, ongoing developments in  international 
relations at that time, the structural and perceived capacity of receiving states to cope 
with the refugee influx, and long-standing migration-related security concerns 
influenced the responses of many European governments amid the mass population 
movement. However, I also suggest that the surfacing of par-ticular policies across 
Europe was related to the newly elected Greek government’s attempted U-turn from 
similar repressive and controversial policies during that time. In this regard, I 
maintain that repressive and controversial migration, asylum, and border control 
policies cannot simply be abolished within the context of the eu com-mon market 
and interdependence of eu internal and external controls.
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 Introduction
In 2015, Europe experienced an unexpected mass population movement 
through the Eastern Mediterranean route. Only in August, more than 100,000 
2people arrived on the Greek islands, a significant increase compared to the 
54,000 that had entered the country the previous month. In October, that 
figure doubled again to more than 200,000 people. By the end of 2015, it is 
estimated that more than 850,000 people had crossed the Greek-Turkish sea 
border.1 Within this context, Greece began overtly ignoring the provisions 
of the Dublin Regulation, and allowed newcomers to move on unregistered 
and unimpeded to their preferred destination countries in mainland Europe, 
mainly Germany and Sweden (Trauner 2016: 319).
At the eu level the response was slow and hesitant, and didn’t go deep 
enough to address and treat the actual dilemma behind the ‘refugee crisis’ 
(see Carrera et al 2015).2 This contributed to the creation of a humanitarian 
emergency in Greece, particularly on the islands (see Skleparis and Armakolas 
2016). In this regard, the establishment of the eu relocation mechanism and 
the opening of the ‘Balkan route’ to destination countries in mainland Europe 
were emergency measures that attempted to relieve some of the tensions cre-
ated by the refugee influx in Greece. Yet, at the same time, the very opening of 
the ‘Balkan route’ was a manifestation of the eu’s inability to reach a collec-
tive and sustainable response to the mass population movement. Eventually, 
a ‘containment strategy’ prevailed, marked by the ‘eu-Turkey joint statement’ 
and the closure of the ‘Balkan route’ in March 2016, which aimed to put an end 
to the uncontrolled mass population movement through the Eastern Mediter-
ranean route (see Trauner 2016).
At the national level, however, the responses were much bolder. In the face 
of the refugee influx many European governments on the mainland quickly 
introduced a number of restrictive and, often, controversial migration, asylum, 
and border control policies. All in all, the tightening of migration and asylum 
policies, the reintroduction of temporary internal border controls, the militari-
sation of internal border controls, the erection of barbed-wire fences, and the 
establishment of daily caps on asylum applications and border-crossings com-
prised the responses of many European governments to the refugee influx. In 
April 2016, the un Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon hit out at the ‘increasingly 
restrictive’ European asylum policies in his speech to the Austrian parliament, 
1 See unhcr Mediterranean Refugees/Migrants Data Portal. Available from: http://data2 
.unhcr.org/en/s ituations/mediterranean/location/5179.
2 I prefer the use of the term ‘refugee crisis’ to ‘migration crisis’, as the vast majority of new-
comers along the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2015–2016 came from the top 10 source 
countries of refugees. I use the term in inverted commas to denote that this was a crisis 
which was largely caused by the implementation of specific policies, or lack thereof, and not 
refugees themselves.
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which had voted in favour of some of the continent’s most stringent laws  
(The Guardian 2016). He expressed his concern that ‘European countries are 
now adopting increasingly restrictive immigration and refugee policies’, and 
added that ‘such policies negatively affect the obligation of member states un-
der international humanitarian law and European law’ (ibid). The aim of this 
paper is to identify and analyse the factors that shaped these repressive and, 
often, controversial responses from many European governments.
By drawing on migration studies literature and policy analysis, I argue that 
past legal-bureaucratic choices on migration and asylum policies made by 
European governments, ongoing developments in international relations at 
that time, the structural and perceived capacity of receiving countries to cope 
with the refugee influx, and migration-related security concerns shaped the 
responses of many European governments in the face of the mass population 
movement. Moreover, I maintain that within the context of the European 
single market and the interdependence of internal and external controls, cer-
tain migration, asylum, and border control policy choices made by the Greek 
government in 2015–2016, up until the ‘eu-Turkey joint statement’, also 
shaped the respective policies of many mainland European governments. In 
fact, I suggest that the Greek government’s response to the ‘refugee crisis’ 
rendered the spread of repressive and controversial policies across Europe 
unavoidable, since migration to the eu is rendered governable, manageable, 
and controlla-ble at the expense of those who seek international protection, 
insofar as some European states rely on controversial and restrictive policies 
and tactics more than others.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section puts forward a typology 
of factors that shape government responses to mass population movements. 
This is followed by an overview of the repressive and controversial responses 
of many European governments in the face of the ‘refugee crisis’, and an anal-
ysis of the factors that shaped them. The rest of the paper traces the Greek 
government’s response to the mass population movement and analyses the 
factors that influenced it, in an attempt to add an extra layer of analysis to the 
policy choices made across Europe.
Government Responses to Mass Population Movements
It has been commonly argued that states’ power to control migration has been 
curtailed by national, international, and supranational norms which push 
governments towards more liberal migration policies (see Cornelius, Martin, 
and Hollifield 1994; Soysal 1994; Sassen 1999; Joppke 2001). More specifically, 
4Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield (1994) and Joppke (2001) have suggested that 
policy makers have lost their power to opt for their preferred restrictive migra-
tion policies to the judiciary, which limits the leverage of the executive and 
legislative to ban or expel unwanted migrants. In other words, states’ capac-
ity to pursue restrictive migration policies has been curtailed by ‘rights-based 
liberalism’ (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994). Similarly, Soysal (1994) and 
Sassen (1999) have emphasised the emergence of international and European 
human rights regimes and their role in limiting states’ power to control migra-
tion. For instance, the establishment of the free movement of people within 
the eu has inevitably transposed state authority over entry and stay of third 
country nationals to the eu institutions (Sassen 1999).
In the face of mass population movements host governments must make 
quick decisions across a number of issues. In such circumstances, states’ com-
mitment to international justice is fragile, which creates obvious implications 
for migrants and refugees (Boswell 2007: 87). Where rights provisions coincide 
with pragmatically grounded commitment to liberal regimes migrants and 
refugees may benefit from generous provisions (ibid). Where there is lack or 
absence of pragmatic arguments, ‘rights-based liberalism’ is not expected to 
provide very reliable coverage of individual rights (ibid).
Host government responses refer to the actions (or inactions) of govern-
ments and other state institutions that include specific asylum policies, unof-
ficial actions, and migration policy implementation (Jacobsen 1996: 657). In 
the face of a mass population movement host governments are presented with 
three choices: they can do nothing; they can respond positively; or they can re-
spond negatively to the movement (ibid: 658). Inaction suggests that the host 
government either is incapable of action, is reluctant to take action, or that it 
regards the mass population movement as an insignificant issue for its agenda 
(Gordenker 1987). Any kind of host government action suggests that the num-
bers of newcomers pose a challenge, and/or are perceived to pose a challenge, 
to the state’s infrastructure and security (Jacobsen 1996: 657). Positive actions 
are compliant with international rules and recommendations, while negative 
actions, such as restrictive and/or controversial migration, asylum, and border 
control policies, are often in stark contrast to the international rule of law.
Since the early 1990s several migration scholars have attempted to explore 
the effects of international migration and refugee flows on security and sta-
bility across different national and regional contexts (see Adamson 2006; 
Lohrmann 2000; Loescher 1992; Weiner 1992). Their purpose was to facilitate 
the decision-making process of receiving governments in response to mass 
population movements by providing a comprehensive and descriptive cat-
egorisation of the circumstances under which such movements come to be 
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perceived as security threats. Influenced by this strand of research, Jacobsen 
(1996) developed a typology of four broad categories of factors that affect re-
ceiving governments’ responses to mass population movements: past bureau-
cratic choices made by governments; international relations developments; 
the absorption capacity of the host country; and security considerations.
Jacobsen assumes that prior legal-bureaucratic decisions on migration and 
asylum policies affect subsequent policy decisions, or else, that past policy out-
puts become future policy inputs. She also suggests that ongoing international 
relations developments guide receiving governments’ interaction with the in-
ternational migration and refugee regimes and shape their policy responses. 
Absorption capacity refers to various social, economic, and cultural factors 
that affect host governments’ policy responses in the face of mass population 
movements. It is understood as both the ability and willingness of a country 
to absorb an influx of refugees. Structural ability is determined by such fac-
tors as economic capacity. Willingness, on the other hand, is affected by the 
host country’s perception of its ability to absorb refugees, beliefs about the 
motivations of newcomers, the ethnic and/or religious affinity between host 
and refugee populations, historical experiences of forced displacement among 
the host population, and the cultural meaning that the host society ascribes to 
refugees. These factors, according to Jacobsen, influence social receptiveness, 
or, to put it in another way, the willingness of receiving countries to absorb an 
influx of refugees. Finally, she identifies security concerns as the fourth factor 
that can potentially shape a receiving government’s response to a mass popu-
lation movement. These concerns mainly derive from the ‘migration-security 
continuum’ rationale – prevalent in policy circles – according to which terror-
ism, international crime and migration are connected (see Bigo and Tsoukala 
2008).
The next section draws on the aforementioned factors in an attempt to ex-
plain why many European governments, even in traditionally liberal states, re-
sorted to restrictive and controversial policies in the face of the ‘refugee crisis’.
European Governments’ Responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’
Past legal-bureaucratic decisions on migration, asylum, and border control 
policies significantly affected the policy decisions made by a number of Eu-
ropean governments in the face of the ‘refugee crisis’. European governments 
had already started to implement tighter migration policies following the 
1973 oil price hikes (Cross 2009: 172). In the 1980s and 1990s, asylum-seeking 
became the main gateway to Western Europe amidst growing fears that the 
6influx of asylum seekers would undermine the refugee regime and dismantle 
the welfare state (Hollifield 2004: 897). Subsequently, the ties between mi-
gration, asylum, and security were strengthened across eu member-states 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Karyotis 2007). This reinforcement of the 
‘migration-asylum-security nexus’ was accompanied by tighter asylum poli-
cies, and increasing reliance of Western governments on practices of policing 
and social control of migrants and asylum seekers.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks a shift in the relationship between migration 
law and security concerns resulted in the ‘normalisation’ of security issues 
within migration law (Dauvergne 2007). It is not the case that the 9/11 events 
marked the beginning of the securitisation of migration. They rather served as 
a tidal wave clearing away political opposition to the advance of increasingly 
tight migration control policies, or at least served to silence this opposition 
(Brouwer 2003: 402). Since the 9/11 attacks, accelerated initiatives to combat 
terrorism in the eu have resulted in the transgression of human rights norms, 
particularly in the area of migration (Mitsilegas 2015). In other words, after the 
9/11 attacks liberal states have started to rely more explicitly on repressive and 
controversial migration, asylum, and border control policies. Hence, it can be 
argued that past policies and decisions after the 9/11 terrorist attacks largely 
shaped the negative responses of many European states to the ‘refugee crisis’, 
particularly as regards the tightening of migration and asylum policies.
It can be also argued that international relations developments influenced 
European governments’ responses. The collective weakness of the eu in its fail-
ure to come up with a timely and sustainable solution to the soaring numbers 
of newcomers, in combination with the anxiety regarding whether and when 
such a solution would be forthcoming, led a number of European governments 
to increasingly resort to unilateral repressive and, often, controversial policies. 
Germany’s decision to coordinate the opening of the ‘Balkan route’ was also 
perceived by many states as a violation of their sovereignty, which fed into 
the reinstatement of temporary internal border controls. The November 2015 
Paris attacks and the fact that some of the terrorists had used Greece as a tran-
sit country to mainland Europe acted as a catalyst to the adoption of these 
policies.
Constraints in the structural capacity of many European states to process 
a plethora of asylum applications and provide for hundreds of thousands of 
asylum seekers arguably also shaped negative policy responses to the mass 
population movement. More than 1,250,000 people applied for international 
protection in the eu member-states in 2015, a number more than double that 
of the previous year (Eurostat 2016). Germany registered the highest number 
of first-time applicants in the eu (441,800 first-time applicants, or 35% of all 
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first-time applicants in the eu), followed by Hungary (174,400, or 14%), and 
Sweden (156,100, or 12%). Within this context, the curtailment of social assis-
tance and access to other social rights for migrants and refugees can be justi-
fied as a way of limiting the number of asylum applications (Huysmans 2000: 
767). According to this line of thought, welfare provisions act as a magnet pull-
ing migrants and refugees into the eu, increasing in this way the competition 
over the distribution of social goods, such as housing, healthcare, unemploy-
ment benefits, jobs, and other social services (ibid). Scarcity transforms mi-
grants and refugees into competitors with citizens in the labour market and 
the distribution of social services and goods (ibid), which subsequently affects 
the willingness of the host society to absorb the newcomers.
In this regard, it can be suggested that limited willingness to absorb the influx 
of refugees also influenced the negative policy responses of many  European 
governments. According to the spring 2016 Eurobarometer survey, immigra-
tion was seen as the major challenge facing the eu (European Commission 
2016). Six out of ten Europeans had negative feelings about the immigration 
of people from outside the eu (ibid). Indeed, the labels of ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’, 
and ‘asylum seeker’ are politically powerful signifiers in contemporary Europe 
and have the ‘capacity to connect the internal security logic to the big political 
questions of cultural and racial identity, challenges to the welfare state, and 
the legitimacy of the post-war political order’ (Huysmans 2000: 761). The repre-
sentation of migration as a cultural challenge to social and political integration 
has become an important source of justification for employing restrictive mi-
gration and asylum policies across Europe (ibid: 762). This was apparent in the 
‘refugee crisis’ as well. Far-right parties and conservative political elites across a 
number of eu member-states successfully manipulated significant migration-
related public fears and anxieties with respect to the protection of national 
security and the myth of cultural homogeneity, eventually pushing their re-
spective governments to increasingly resort to unilateral repressive policies, 
which many times were quite controversial.
Finally, common market security concerns arguably largely shaped many 
European governments’ decision to reintroduce temporary internal border 
controls. The central element of these concerns is the assumption that the 
establishment of a common market and the subsequent abolition of internal 
border controls have not only improved transnational flows of goods, capital, 
services, and people, but that they have also facilitated illegal and criminal 
activities by terrorists, international criminal networks, asylum seekers, and 
immigrants (Huysmans 2000). The abolition of internal border controls was 
based on the premise that the external border controls of the eu were strong 
enough to guarantee a sufficient level of command over who and what could 
8legitimately enter the space of free movement (Anderson 1996: 186–187). In 
this regard, terrorism, drugs, and crime on the one hand, and the rights of mi-
grants, refugees, and asylum seekers on the other, have to be treated together 
as they constitute a security continuum connecting border controls, terrorism, 
international crime, and migration (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008).
Tightening Migration and Asylum Policies
Restricting access to work and residence permits, welfare provisions, and so-
cial assistance, and hindering access to international protection and related 
provisions have sometimes proven to be more important tools for curbing the 
free movement of people than border controls (Huysmans 2000), at the ex-
pense of the most vulnerable and those in need of international protection.
In response to the refugee influx, a number of European governments pro-
ceeded with the tightening of their national migration and asylum laws, which 
oftentimes were in sharp contrast to their obligations under European and in-
ternational law. In September 2015, the Hungarian government changed its mi-
gration and criminal law in a way that effectively denied asylum seekers access 
to protection. Under the new laws, entering Hungary except at official crossing 
points was made a crime punishable by up to eight years in prison. Serbia was 
declared a safe third country, and those who were arrested entering through 
it were made liable to summary return there. Criminal convictions were ac-
companied by a 1-3-year re-entry ban to Hungary. All asylum claims were de-
termined through an accelerated procedure, while most of them were rejected 
as inadmissible since they were filed by persons who had entered Hungary 
through a safe third country. Rejected asylum seekers were held indefinitely in 
detention pending removal, mainly to Serbia. Under the new laws detention 
was applied systematically and indiscriminately to all asylum seekers. The new 
laws resulted in prolonged periods of detention, poor detention conditions, 
and the further exacerbation of the living conditions and rights of vulnerable 
groups of people (hrw 2015a).
The German government restricted family reunification for persons granted 
subsidiary protection. Moreover, in October 2015, it extended the list of safe 
countries of origin to include Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro. This entailed 
that asylum applications from these countries were summarily considered as 
manifestly unfounded, since German asylum authorities were bound by law to 
assume that conditions of persecution, inhuman or degrading treatment, or 
punishment did not exist in these countries. Even before the official extension 
of the list of safe countries of origin, in September 2015, the Federal State of 
Bavaria had paved the way for this move by introducing two combined recep-
tion and return centres for those asylum seekers with no prospect of remaining 
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in the country, forcing them to stay in these facilities for the whole duration of 
their procedures. Human rights ngos criticised Germany’s decision to acceler-
ate procedures for asylum seekers from these countries on the basis that it put 
too much emphasis on deterrence and exclusion (Euronews 2015).
In November 2015, the Swedish government announced changes in its asy-
lum legislation that aimed to reduce the number of asylum seekers arriving 
in the country. The law reform restricted the right to family reunification to 
refugees and their immediate family members only; reduced the duration 
of residence permits to 3 years for refugees and 1 year for subsidiary protec-
tion beneficiaries; rendered permanent residence permits dependent on 
self-sufficiency in the country; and removed the right to protection under the 
‘otherwise in need of protection’ status, a domestic provision intended for peo-
ple who did not qualify either for refugee status or subsidiary protection, but 
still had protection needs. The unhcr (2016a) criticised Sweden’s law reform 
on the basis that it would undermine the rights of unaccompanied migrant 
children in the country, and that it would have a ‘detrimental effect’ on sepa-
rated families.
Similarly, in November 2015, the Danish government presented a legislative 
package on asylum with 34 tightening measures intended to stem the influx of 
asylum seekers to the country by making it a less appealing destination. Mea-
sures included shorter residence permits, stricter necessary conditions for the 
obtainment of permanent residence permits in the country, longer detention 
periods, and more restrictive family reunification policies. One controversial 
measure foresaw the confiscation of valuables from asylum seekers by the Dan-
ish authorities to help fund the cost of services provided to refugees.3 The mea-
sure meant that the police would be able to seize valuables worth dkk 10,000 
or more from asylum seekers. The legislative package attracted heavy criticism 
by ngos. The government was accused of violating human rights with its new 
laws, which encouraged an increased number of arrests of third country na-
tionals, as well as weaker judicial control (The Local 2015). The unhcr warned 
that the new bill could violate a number of international conventions, includ-
ing the global convention on the rights of the child (unhcr 2016b).
In January 2016, the Austrian government put forward a proposal that in-
cluded, among other measures, an upper limit of 127,500 refugees that would 
be allowed to apply for asylum in the country over the course of four years. 
Other measures included stricter enforcement of entry checks at the borders 
and tougher return policies for rejected asylum seekers. However, the Austrian 
3 The same policy was later followed by Switzerland and some German Federal States, such as 
Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg.
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government had to backtrack on its proposal for an upper limit of refugees, as 
it was found incompatible with international and European law. The govern-
ment eventually returned with a new law, which enabled it to declare a state of 
emergency in case migrant flows threatened the country’s ‘national security’ 
and take a series of ‘special measures’. Once a state of emergency is activated, 
a fast-track admissibility procedure for asylum seekers can be implemented at 
Austrian borders, according to which asylum claims can be deemed inadmis-
sible and asylum seekers can be returned to the countries they transited from, 
on the assumption that Austria’s neighbours are safe for refugees. Only minors 
and pregnant women, and individuals who face real risk of torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment in a neighbouring transit country or who have nuclear 
family members already in the country would be admitted into Austria. In ad-
dition, the detention period of rejected asylum seekers was extended and the 
duration of the refugee status was limited. The Austrian government moved 
forward with the new law despite the fact that it attracted strong criticism 
from the unhcr and the Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, 
who called the measures ‘highly problematic’ (orf 2016). hrw (2016) stated 
that the new law will block access to a fair and efficient asylum procedure, and 
will violate the right to an effective remedy for the majority of asylum seekers 
in Austria, while it also ‘risks instituting blanket, automatic detention without 
due attention to particularly vulnerable asylum seekers’.
Tightening Internal Border Controls
As soon as the number of asylum applications started to increase sharply, a 
number of European governments, such as those in Germany, Austria, Slove-
nia, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium, started to reinstate 
temporary internal border controls in an attempt to hinder large numbers of 
asylum seekers from seeking refuge in their territories.4 Governments whose 
countries were in the middle of the ‘Balkan route’, such as Austria, Hungary, 
fyrom, and Slovenia, started building fences along their borders in an attempt 
to curb and geographically displace the flow of people. These policies were 
accompanied in some cases by a drastic militarisation of internal border con-
trols, and introduction of daily caps on border crossings and asylum claims, 
which clearly broke the rules of international protection. These unilateral ac-
tions of initially a few European governments were guided by the rationale of 
4 Malta and France also reinstated internal border controls after the November Paris attacks to 
counter the ‘threat of terrorism’ under the procedure of Article 27 (former Article 24) of the 
Schengen Borders Code.
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‘passing the buck’ (see Lavenex 1998) and caused a domino effect of repressive 
and controversial responses across Europe.
On 20 August 2015, fyrom deployed army forces and riot police, and called 
for a state of emergency to stop the uncontrolled movement of migrants and 
refugees crossing from Greece. On 14 September 2015, Germany introduced 
temporary border controls with Austria to cope with the influx of people. 
Following Germany, Austria also reinstated temporary border controls with 
Hungary, and deployed army forces to support border police at the Austrian-
Hungarian border. In fear of being inevitably turned into a de facto destina-
tion country due to the unilateral actions of its neighbour, Hungary completed 
on 15 September 2015 a border fence at its border with Serbia. The aim of the 
175-km-long fence at the Hungarian-Serbian border was to deter migrants and 
refugees, and channel the flow to legal border crossing points. Sealing off the 
Hungarian-Serbian border made Croatia anxious that the flow would be even-
tually redirected towards the Croatian-Serbian border. Because of this, Croatia 
temporarily closed its border for a few days to slow down the movement of 
people, and introduced a daily cap on border crossings, according to which 
only a certain number of asylum seekers per day was allowed to enter the 
country.
On 16 October 2015, Hungary completed the construction of a fence at the 
Hungarian-Croatian border as well, which had already become the main gate-
way after the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border. In tandem with the 
sealing of the Hungarian-Croatian border, Slovenia introduced a daily cap 
on border crossings, which permitted a maximum of 2,500 arrivals a day. Fur-
thermore, Slovenia deployed the army to help patrol the Slovenian-Croatian 
border, which had become the main entrance to destination countries after 
the sealing of Hungary’s borders with its Balkan neighbours. On 11 November 
2015, Slovenia began erecting a razor-wire fence along parts of the Slovenian-
Croatian border to control the flows and redirect them to certain monitored 
crossing points. Two days later, on 13 November 2015, Austria started construct-
ing a wire fence along the Spielfeld border crossing between Austria and Slove-
nia. Again, the aim was to hinder the flow of people, and reroute it to specific 
border crossing points.
Common market security concerns became particularly acute after the No- 
vember 2015 Paris attacks. Five days after the terrorist attacks, on 18 November 
2015, fyrom, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia announced in a coordinated man- 
ner that they would only allow Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghanis to pass through 
their borders, considering nationals of all other countries unlikely to be refu- 
gees. This clearly constituted a discriminatory border policy in breach of rules 
of international protection, as under international law it is illegal to reject 
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asylum seekers based on their nationality and without any possibility of hav-
ing their individual circumstances taken into consideration (Amnesty Interna-
tional 2015). In turn, this policy resulted in illegal pushbacks of asylum seekers 
to Greece, and the use of violence by fyrom authorities. On top of that, on 28 
November 2015 fyrom started constructing a fence along its southern border 
with Greece, which signalled the beginning of the end of the ‘Balkan route’.
Increased common market security concerns led countries with a long- 
standing tradition of liberal values, such as Sweden and Denmark, to resort to 
repressive and controversial border control practices that bent the rules of 
international protection. On 4 January 2016, Sweden introduced internal bor-
der id controls on all means of transport entering from Denmark. The aim of 
this policy was to reduce the number of asylum applications in the country by 
making Sweden a safe place for only a select few, as only a limited num-ber of 
asylum seekers actually had any form of identification. Sweden’s move 
prompted Denmark, which was concerned about the potential for a bottle- 
neck of asylum seekers transiting through the country, to impose a temporary 
border control along its German border. Moreover, since January 2016, Austria 
periodically introduced internal border controls, citing concerns about the in- 
flux of asylum seekers. In addition, in mid-February 2016, Austria introduced a 
daily cap of 80 asylum applications at its borders, a policy which was 
described by European Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos as 
‘plainly in-compatible with Austria’s obligations under European and 
international law’ (EurActiv 2016).
The tightening of migration and asylum policies, the reintroduction of tem- 
porary internal border controls, the militarisation of internal border controls, 
the construction of barbed-wire fences, and the introduction of daily caps on 
asylum applications and border-crossings comprised many European govern- 
ments’ responses to the ‘refugee crisis’. These responses were often found to 
be in stark contrast to the rules of international protection. So far, I have 
argued that these responses were influenced by previous policy choices made 
by European governments, international relations developments, the 
structural and perceived absorption capacity of receiving countries, and 
security considerations. However, I also argue that these factors alone cannot 
adequately jus- tify the emergence of such repressive and controversial 
policies across Europe, particularly in countries with long-held liberal 
traditions.
The next sections look at the Greek government’s response to the mass 
pop- ulation movement. I maintain that certain migration, asylum, and 
border control policy choices made by Greece in 2015–2016, up until the ‘eu-
Turkey joint statement’ in March 2016, significantly shaped the repressive and 
con- troversial policies employed by other European governments in response 
to 
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the refugee influx. As stated earlier, the establishment of the European single 
market entails that internal and external controls are interdependent.
The Greek Government’s Response to the ‘Refugee Crisis’
The issue of migration was securitised in Greece in the early 1990s, that is when 
the country first became host to mass population movements from the Bal-
kans and Eastern Europe (Karyotis and Patrikios 2010; Karyotis 2012; Karyotis 
and Skleparis 2013; Skleparis 2016). ‘Illegal migration’ again became the top is-
sue in the Greek political agenda in 2012, after the far-right extremist party 
Golden Dawn increased its popularity in opinion polls prior to the 2012 double 
legislative elections (Lazaridis and Skleparis 2016). The conservative party 
New Democracy, in fear of losing votes in the upcoming elections, adopted the 
anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric of its far-right opponent, and made a 
number of pledges in this direction (ibid). Following Golden Dawn’s electoral 
success in both the May and the June elections of that year, the new unity gov-
ernment5 led by New Democracy, adhering to its pledges, introduced several 
repressive policies that aimed to stem ‘illegal migration flows’, and combat ‘il-
legal stay’ of third-country nationals in the country (ibid).
In August 2012, Operations Aspida (Shield) and Xenios Zeus were introduced 
simultaneously at the Greek-Turkish land border and in mainland Greece re-
spectively in a coordinated attempt to provide a holistic solution to both ‘il-
legal entry and stay’ of third-country nationals. Two months later, in October 
2012, the detention period of asylum seekers was extended from six to eighteen 
months in total. These repressive measures were topped up with the construc-
tion of a 12.5-km-long barbed-wire fence along the Greek-Turkish land bor-
der in December 2012. Finally, a conservative citizenship law was introduced, 
which excluded second-generation migrants born and raised in Greece from 
Greek citizenship. Arguably, Greece had a rich record of repressive, and often 
controversial legal-bureaucratic decisions on migration, asylum, and border 
control policies before the 2015–2016 ‘refugee crisis’.
In 2015, the newly-elected left-wing syriza-led coalition government 
performed a 180-degree turn from the repressive policies and practices of 
the previous government (Skleparis 2017). Prior to the elections, syriza had 
5 A unity government is usually formed during a time of national emergency. In June 2012, 
in the face of an imminent ‘grexit’, the first (New Democracy), third (pasok), and sixth 
(dimar) parties that emerged from the election agreed to form a unity government in order 
to prevent Greece from exiting the Eurozone.
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pledged to expedite the asylum application process, close down the deten-
tion centres and replace them with open hospitality centres, stop the use of 
systematic and indiscriminate detention, end push-backs at the borders, re-
move the 12.5-km-long barbed-wire fence from the Greek-Turkish land border, 
encourage family reunification, remove intra-eu restrictions on the travel of 
migrants, grant citizenship to second-generation migrants, and reinforce the 
protection of human rights in general (Katsiaficas 2015). After winning the Jan-
uary 2015 elections, and amid rapidly increasing refugee flows, the syriza-led 
coalition government attempted to stick to its promises to liberalise the coun-
try’s migration, asylum, and border control policies. The pledges and policies 
of the new government were welcomed by human rights agencies (see hrw 
2015b; 2015c; cpt 2016). Yet, at the same time, the syriza-led coalition govern-
ment was heavily criticised for failing to address the needs of newcomers (see 
Amnesty International 2016; cpt 2016).
Contra the general trend in the rest of Europe, Greece’s policies became less 
restrictive during the same period of time. Presumably the Greek government 
underestimated the volume of the population movement, and, at the same 
time, perhaps overestimated the country’s structural capacity to cope with the 
refugee influx. What is more, the new government’s decision to liberalise the 
country’s migration, asylum, and border control policies clearly defied past 
governments’ legal-bureaucratic decisions in this realm. This might be relat-
ed to the government’s fear that employment of repressive and controversial 
policies in response to a mass population movement would attract negative 
international publicity, which didn’t fit its left-wing, progressive profile. Lib-
eral policies in the realm of migration, asylum, and border control policies 
are particularly appealing to left-wing audiences, and the syriza-led coali-
tion government wanted to leave its left-wing mark there as soon as possible. 
Within the context of tough bailout negotiations and limited room for ma-
noeuvre regarding the potential implementation of socialist fiscal policies, the 
government quickly understood that its only opportunity to clearly demarcate 
itself from the previous governments that followed the path of austerity was in 
the realm of migration, asylum, and border control policies, where it (falsely) 
perceived that it possessed more leverage. Finally, one can also argue that the 
syriza-led coalition government perhaps operationalised the liberalisation of 
migration, asylum, and border control policies amid the refugee influx in an 
attempt to gain leverage in the bailout negotiations.
Liberalising Migration and Asylum Policies
The previous conservative government had extended the administrative deten-
tion period of asylum seekers in Greece to eighteen months. In addition, it had 
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reduced from thirty to seven days the period that irregular migrants and 
rejected asylum seekers could remain in Greece if not held in detention. It had 
topped up these measures with the introduction of the policy of systematic 
detention of all irregular migrants, including women, unaccompanied minors, 
and other vulnerable groups. Commenting on these policies and practices on 
16 April 2013 the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
(2013), Nils Muižnieks, had expressed serious concerns that the violations of 
human rights of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Greece rendered 
them even more vulnerable to racist crimes. The Commissioner had urged the 
Greek authori- ties to review certain policies, such as systematic and 
prolonged detention in substandard conditions (ibid). Despite all criticisms, 
these policies were never reviewed by the Greek government in the 2012–2014 
timeframe.
     A few months after its election in 2015, the new government drastically re-
viewed the country’s detention and return policies. In March 2015, the Alter-
nate Minister for Migration Policy made it clear that detention would be used 
by the new government only as ‘an exceptional measure’ (Aljazeera 2015). 
Sub-sequently, the Alternate Minister reactivated Law 3709/11, which foresaw 
that refugees would be accommodated in open hospitality centres, while 
irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers would be provided with a 30-
day period without being detained in order to voluntarily return to their home 
countries. Only after the expiry of the 30-day period would the authorities 
have the right to return irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers to their 
countries of origin. In those cases where returns were not possible (i.e. the 
vast majority of cases), the government would provide those individuals with 
a 6-month tem-porary residence permit, under the condition that they visit 
the local police station twice a month.
Along the same lines, the Alternate Minister for Public Order and Civil 
Protection proclaimed the closure of migrant detention centres, and their 
gradual transformation into open hospitality centres with improved living 
conditions. The implementation of this policy started with the Amygdaleza’ 
detention centre in early February 2015, when the Alternate Minister visited 
the infamous facility after the suicide of a Pakistani detainee and proclaimed 
its closure (Kathimerini 2015). In the four weeks that followed, thousands of 
asylum seekers, particularly vulnerable groups who had been detained longer 
than six months, were gradually released. The authorities transported them by 
coaches from the detention centres to downtown Athens, and provided them 
with the addresses of various ngos and volunteer groups in order for them to 
be able to fend for themselves, exposing them in this way to increased vulner-
ability to human trafficking and smuggling networks. Those who were released 
were also provided with a six-month residence permit. A few months later, in 
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August 2015, the first open hospitality centre in Elaionas, Athens, welcomed its 
first guests. In all, these policies practically abolished the strategy of system-
atic and indiscriminate detention of the previous government, and limited the 
number of returns.6
Finally, the syriza-led coalition government introduced a new Citizenship 
Bill in summer 2015, which enabled second-generation migrants born and 
raised in Greece to apply for Greek citizenship. Law 4332/2015 was ratified by 
the Greek parliament on 9 July 2015 and amended the previous conservative 
Greek Citizenship Code (Law 4521/2014).
In sum, repressive and controversial migration and asylum policies did not 
appear for the first time across Europe in response to the ‘refugee crisis’. Similar 
repressive and controversial migration and asylum policies had been exten- 
sively utilised by the Greek unity government in the 2012–2014 period in an 
attempt to deter irregular entry and stay of third-country nationals. The newly- 
elected Greek government, however, U-turned from these policies in 2015. This 
liberal turn contributed to the surfacing of similar repressive and controversial 
migration and asylum policies across Europe in response to the mass popula- 
tion movement. I further elaborate on this argument in the next section, 
where I document the new government’s liberal turn with regard to Greece’s 
border control policies. After all, the establishment of the eu’s common 
market introduced a condition of interdependence in the relationship 
between inter- nal and external controls, whereby the former can remain lax 
insofar as the latter hold firm.
Liberalising Border Controls
In August 2012, the unity government simultaneously introduced operations 
Aspida (Shield) and Xenios Zeus at the Greek-Turkish land border and in main-
land Greece respectively in an orchestrated attempt to provide a holistic solu-
tion to both ‘illegal entry and stay’ of third-country nationals. These policies 
were complemented with the erection of a barbed-wire fence along the land 
border between Greece and Turkey. These repressive and controversial policies 
constituted an attempt by the Greek authorities to ‘recuperate’ city centres, 
which had been ‘occupied’ by ‘illegal migrants’ and were subjected to ‘illegal 
activities’.7
6 According to the Hellenic Police data, 20,868 third-country nationals were returned in 2015, 
compared to 27,789 in 2014. Out of a total of 20,868 removal operations, 17,097 were forced 
returns, and only 3,771 were voluntary. In 2014, the respective numbers were 20,293 and 7,496.
7 Prime Minister’s speech to the parliamentary group of New Democracy, 4 November 2012.
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Operation Aspida aimed at beefing up border controls, surveillance, and pa-
trols at the Greek-Turkish land border, which was one of the main gateways to 
Europe at that point. Approximately 1,800 additional Hellenic Police officers 
and advanced technical equipment were deployed in the region. Patrol boats 
reinforced border controls across the river Evros (Strik 2013: 9). Border guards 
were equipped with night vision goggles and cameras, and electronic surveil-
lance devices (ibid). Aiming at the further externalisation of border controls, 
the operation also attempted to improve cooperation between the Greek and 
Turkish local border authorities through the introduction of modern tactics 
of border surveillance (Frontex 2013: 23). During the same period, Operation 
Xenios Zeus was initially introduced in Athens, and later in other major cities 
across the country, in an attempt to crack down on ‘illegal stay’ of third-country 
nationals. The detection of migrants ‘staying illegally’ in urban centres across 
Greece was followed by their – up to eighteen-month-long – detention until 
their eventual deportation. The magnitude of the operation was manifested by 
the fact that only in its first week about 4,500 police officers conducted raids 
on streets and in run-down buildings, rendering Xenios Zeus one of the largest 
ever ‘sweep operations’ in the country (The New York Times 2012).
These policies had a devastating impact on the lives and rights of migrants, 
refugees, and asylum seekers in Greece (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013), while hu- 
man rights violations in immigration enforcement thrived at both the Greek-
Turkish border and in mainland Greece (Skleparis 2016). However, despite all 
criticisms, these repressive policies were never reviewed by the Greek govern- 
ment within the 2012–2014 timeframe, mainly because they proved to be quite 
successful in controlling migration flows at the expense of human rights. As 
Figure 1 indicates, since these policies and practices were first in- troduced in 
2012, the number of apprehended irregular migrants dropped by more than 
20,000 compared to the previous year. One year on, in 2013, irregular 
migration flows were reduced by more than 55,000 compared to 2011. 
However, in 2014, the number of apprehended irregular migrants returned to 
its 2012 lev- els, as irregular migration flows were rerouted from land to sea 
borders, where Operation Aspida had not been introduced. The geographical 
displacement of the flows, however, was neither a failure nor an unintended 
consequence of the employed border control policies and practices. Rather, 
geographical dis- placement was an underlying goal and desired outcome of 
the border control operation (see Burridge 2012).
In 2015, the newly-elected coalition government embarked on an orches-
trated 180-degree turn from the repressive and controversial border con-
trol policies and practices of the previous government. In February 2015, the 
Alternate Minister for Migration Policy proclaimed the end of Operation 
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Xenios Zeus (To Vima 2015). Similarly, Operation Aspida was also discontinued 
on the basis of lack of funds and the significantly reduced migration flows at 
the Greek-Turkish land border (Bolani, Gemi, and Skleparis 2016: 84). More-
over, it was decided that the 12.5-km-long barbed-wire fence in the same area, 
which had suffered major damage due to floods during the winter, would be 
left unrepaired due to lack of funds (ibid). In March 2015, an official document 
(allegedly a ministerial circular) was leaked, which specified that asylum seek-
ers who entered the country irregularly would not be detained at the borders. 
Instead, they would be provided with a document that gave them thirty days to 
leave the country. This was widely perceived as an unofficial ‘travel document’ 
enabling people to transit through Greece (Crawley et al 2016: 14). In July 2015, 
the Alternate Minister of Migration Policy added a last-minute modification to 
the proposed Citizenship Bill, which foresaw the abolition of anti-smuggling 
penalties in cases of transportation of undocumented third-country nationals 
in need of international protection. This small modification virtually abolished 
internal controls and enabled the free movement of all newcomers within 
Greece, legalising, in effect, smuggling, under the cover of transportation for 
humanitarian purposes (Skleparis 2017).
In all, the reintroduction of temporary internal border controls, the militari-
sation of internal border controls, and the construction of barbed-wire fences 
across mainland Europe in response to the ‘refugee crisis’ were directly related 
developments to the Greek government’s decision to give up similar repres-
sive and controversial policies at the external borders of the eu amid the mass 
population movement. The Greek government’s liberal turn with regard to the 
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country’s border control policies had no impact at all, other than accelerating 
the inevitable: it largely contributed to the surfacing of repressive and contro-
versial border control policies across mainland Europe, as in order for internal 
border controls to be lax, external border controls must remain strong.
 Discussion
The paper attempted to provide an explanation as to why many governments 
across Europe, even in traditionally liberal states, resorted to repressive and 
controversial migration, asylum, and border control policies in the face of the 
‘refugee crisis’. I argued that past legal-bureaucratic choices on migration and 
asylum policies in Europe, ongoing developments in international rela- tions 
at that time, the structural and perceived capacity of receiving states to cope 
with the refugee influx, and migration-related security concerns shaped the 
negative responses of many European governments in the face of the mass 
population movement.
However, I also argued that the tightening of migration and asylum poli-
cies, the reintroduction of temporary internal border controls, the militarisa- 
tion of internal border controls, the construction of barbed-wire fences, and 
the establishment of daily caps on asylum applications and border-crossings, 
which comprised many European governments’ responses to the ‘refugee cri- 
sis’, cannot be adequately justified by the aforementioned factors alone. I 
suggested that within the context of the single market, the type of migration, 
asylum, and border control policies that are implemented at the external bor-
ders of the eu greatly influences policy responses in mainland Europe, par- 
ticularly in the face of mass population movements. Henceforth, certain policy 
choices made by the Greek government in 2015–2016, up until the ‘eu-Turkey 
joint statement’, shaped the repressive and controversial actions of many 
mainland European governments in response to the refugee influx. I main- 
tained that the surfacing of particular repressive and controversial policies 
across Europe was related to the newly-elected Greek government’s attempted 
U-turn from similar repressive and controversial policies amid the mass popu-
lation movement. In simple terms, many of the policies that emerged across 
mainland Europe in 2015–2016 had been systematically and effectively imple- 
mented, in one form or another, for years at the external borders of the eu at 
the expense of asylum seekers’ hopes, aspirations, and rights prior to their abo-
lition by the newly-elected Greek government. This suggests that repressive 
and controversial policies of migration government, management, and control 
cannot simply be abolished within the context of the single market and the 
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interdependence of internal and external controls. In a time of mass displace-
ment of populations it is doubtful whether Greece’s liberal policy shift had any 
impact at all, other than accelerating the inevitable spillover of repressive and 
controversial policies of migration government, management, and control to 
mainland Europe.
Repressive and controversial policies and practices constitute fundamental 
elements of migration government, management, and control in the eu. Re-
pressive and controversial migration, asylum, and border control policies did 
not make their first appearance across Europe in response to the ‘refugee crisis’. 
Rather, liberal regimes have long utilised repressive and controversial practices 
of migration government, policing, and control (Bigo et al 2008), even more af-
ter the apparent post-9/11 securitisation of migration in the eu (see Neal 2009). 
In the words of Bigo and Guittet (2011: 493), ‘[w]e are indeed still in liberal 
regimes, dealing with, reproducing and hiding illiberal practices’. According 
to Balzacq and his colleagues (2010: 9) ‘[l]iberal forms of governing are based 
not only on liberal, but also on illiberal practices that are engrained within 
it’. In this respect, repressive and controversial policies and practices are well 
embedded in the liberal state, as law can safeguard fundamental rights, while 
at the same time it can limit the very same (Ewald 1991). By extension, this 
indicates that unequal access to fundamental rights is a defining characteristic 
of liberal states, since repressive and controversial policies and practices are 
incorporated into the technicalities of law and legal government (Lippert and 
Williams 2012: 55).
The non-exhaustive list of such policies and practices includes system-
atic, indiscriminate, and/or prolonged detention of third-country nationals; 
extraordinary rendition and return policies; the use of new practices and 
technologies of border management and control; extended powers of law en-
forcement agencies; lack or absence of transparency and accountability mech-
anisms in border management and control; disproportionate empowerment of 
executive powers; the denial of due process and access to courts; acceleration 
of asylum procedures; limitation of access to international protection; restric-
tions on refugees’ and asylum seekers’ movement; interception of private com-
munications; conditions of quasi-isolation; inhuman or degrading treatment; 
and torture (see Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Jabri 2006; Tsoukala 2006; Aradau 
2008; Basaran 2008; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Ceyhan 2008; Huysmans and Bu-
onfino 2008; Guild, Groenendijk, and Carrera 2009; Bigo, Bonditti, and Olsson 
2010; Topak 2014; Skleparis 2016). Hence, repressive and controversial policies 
and practices that bend or break the rules of international protection did not 
appear across Europe in the face of the ‘refugee crisis’; rather, they are routin-
ised, banal, everyday practices of law and the normal mode of government of 
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liberal regimes (see Bigo et al 2008). Bending or breaking the rules of interna- 
tional protection is what makes migration, asylum, and border control policies 
effective in keeping migrants out of a country at the expense of the lives and 
rights of people on the move. Bending or breaking the rules of international 
protection constitutes an integral element of migration govern- ment, 
management, and control in the eu.
To conclude, the interdependence of the eu internal and external controls, 
in combination with the fact that bending or breaking the rules of interna-
tional protection is an integral element of migration government, manage-
ment, and control in the eu suggests that repressive and controversial  policies 
cannot simply be abolished within the context of the single market. With 
specific regard to the Eastern Mediterranean route, bending or breaking the 
rules of international protection has kept (and continues to keep, after the ‘eu-
Turkey joint statement’) migration flows under control for years by curbing 
and geographically displacing them, and by rendering Greece an unappealing 
destination for asylum seekers at the expense of those who are in need of inter-
national protection. In the absence of effective – and by extension repressive 
and controversial – external border controls in 2015–2016, states in the main-
land were forced to play the role of frontline states by increasingly relying on 
repressive and controversial migration control tactics and policies, similar to 
those which had been abolished in Greece, in order to curb the influx of people 
in their territories.
To be clear: I do not argue that states in mainland Europe had never re- 
sorted to practices of bending or breaking the rules of international 
protection up until the ‘refugee crisis’ and the subsequent policy shift in 
Greece. I rather suggest that migration to the eu is rendered governable, 
manageable, and con- trollable at the expense of those in need of 
international protection insofar as some European states rely on controversial 
and restrictive policies and tactics more than others. Inevitably, this leads to a 
fundamental question: under what conditions can member-states at the 
external borders of the eu liberalise their migration, asylum, and border 
control policies?
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